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Introduction 
 
Standard theorizing about poverty falls into two camps. Social scientists regard the behaviors of 
the economically disadvantaged either as calculated adaptations to prevailing circumstances, or as 
emanating from a unique “culture of poverty,” rife with deviant values. The first camp presumes 
that people are highly rational, that they hold coherent and justified beliefs and pursue their goals 
effectively, without mistakes, and with no need for help. The second camp attributes to the poor a 
variety of psychological and attitudinal short-fallings that render their views often misguided and 
their choices fallible,  leaving them in need of paternalistic guidance.  
 
We propose a third view. The behavioral patterns of the poor, we argue, may be neither perfectly 
calculating nor especially deviant. Rather, the poor may exhibit the same basic weaknesses and 
biases as do people from other walks of life, except that in poverty, with its narrow margins for 
error, the same behaviors often manifest themselves in more pronounced ways and can lead to 
worse outcomes. In what follows, we illustrate the kinds of insights that might be gained from a 
behaviorally more realistic analysis of the economic conditions of the poor, and we propose that 
alternative policies for alleviating poverty be considered. 
 
I. Some General Psychological Insights 
 
Behavioral research has documented the persistent yet shocking capacity of simple situational 
factors to influence behaviors typically presumed to reflect deep dispositions or preferences.   
Consider Milgram’s (1974) well-known obedience studies, in which decent people administered 
purportedly dangerous levels of shock to innocent others, or Darley and Batson’s (1973) study, 
1 Behavioral Economics & Poverty 
where seminarians, late to deliver a practice sermon on the Good Samaritan, failed to stop to help 
a person in need. As it turns out, the pressures exerted by situational factors can create restraining 
forces hard to foresee and to overcome, as well as driving forces that can be harnessed to great 
effect.  As Ross and Nisbett (1991) point out, where standard intuition would hold the primary 
cause of a problem to be human frailty, or the particular weakness of a group of individuals, the 
social psychologist would often look to situational barriers and ways to overcome them.     
 
Indeed, contrary to major interventions that often prove ineffectual, apparently minor situational 
details, referred to as “channel factors,” can have great impact. The opening up of a channel (such 
as an a priori commitment, or a first step) may facilitate some behaviors, whereas other behaviors 
can be blocked by closed channels. In one classic study, college seniors were given persuasive 
messages about the value of an inoculation against tetanus. While the messages were effective at 
changing the students’ beliefs and attitudes, few actually took the step of getting a tetanus shot. 
By contrast, when other students received the same messages but were also given a map of 
campus with the infirmary circled and asked to decide on a particular time, the percentage of 
students getting the inoculation increased by an order of magnitude.  A more recent study of the 
utilization of public health services found that show-up at a counseling center was better 
predicted by people’s distance from the closest center than by other individual differences. Thus, 
simple channel factors such as a map, or mere physical proximity, seem to trump the supposedly 
greater significance of important health messages.  
 
The above examples concern the behavior in a social context of a system – the human 
information processing system – that is quite idiosyncratic and complex. Among other things, the 
psychological carriers of value appear to be gains and losses, rather than final wealth, and 
diminishing sensitivity yields conflicting risk attitudes for losses and gains.  People are loss 
averse (the loss associated with giving up a good is greater than the utility associated with 
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obtaining it), which yields “endowment effects” and a reluctance to depart from the status quo 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). 
 
Also, contrary to standard fungibility assumptions, people compartmentalize wealth and spending 
into distinct budget categories, such as savings, rent, and entertainment, and into separate mental 
accounts, such as current income, assets, and future income (Thaler, 1999). People typically show 
different propensities to consume from their current income (where MPC is high), current assets 
(where it is intermediate), and future income (where it is low). In addition, people often fail to 
ignore sunk costs or to consider opportunity costs, and have trouble predicting their future moods 
and tastes or learning from past experience (Kahneman and Tversky, 2000).  
 
In what follows, we consider the relevance of psychological insights to anti-poverty policy, by 
focusing on two specific examples, financial choices and welfare participation.  
 
II. Banking and Saving 
 
Between 10 and 20 percent of all households in America are without bank accounts (Caskey, 
1994). Not surprisingly, nearly all of the un-banked are poor. The material costs of not having a 
banking account appear quite high.  The un-banked face very high costs to cash their checks and 
pay their bills. Also, they have to save through “cookie-jar” channels that yield no (and sometime 
negative) interest income.    
 
Why then do the poor fail to have bank accounts? Under the rational model, the large costs of not 
having an account must be offset by the presumably large costs of having one. For example, the 
fixed fees of bank accounts and, in particular, the marginal fees of small balance accounts may be 
prohibitively high. The culture of poverty account invokes the poor’s negative attitudes towards 
3 Behavioral Economics & Poverty 
formal financial institutions. Thus, the poor may not understand the benefits of banking or may 
simply distrust banks. 
 
The rational as well as deviant models require large interventions to alter behavior.  Large 
financial subsidies to banks and community groups may be used to create low-cost bank 
accounts, and legislation may be passed to force banks to maintain or re-open branches in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods. Financial education may be encouraged to overcome cultural 
stereotypes and misdirected attitudes.  
 
While these approaches certainly have merit, they focus on “major” factors. Instead, we suggest 
that small situational barriers often play a decisive role in preventing the opening of a bank 
account despite huge benefits. These barriers might be a testy bus ride, challenging hours, or the 
reluctance to face a contemptuous bank-teller. Such barriers are not unlike the embarrassment and 
anxiety that impede many people, including medical doctors, from administering medical self-
exams which they know to be highly valuable.   
 
Mental accounting studies suggest that unlabelled and easily available money will be spent more 
freely than money that is “accounted for,’’ leading to very low saving rates among the un-banked, 
who may then resort to negative interest saving vehicles, such as lay-away plans or rent-to-own, 
which are immediately available and less subject to the adoption barriers that come with bank 
accounts. 
 
Policy Implications 
 
The behavioral perspective suggests several routes to improve banking and saving choices among 
the poor. First, policies that establish better “defaults” should be explored. Because recipients of 
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government transfers may find it simpler to allow for the opening of a bank account to which 
money is electronically deposited, recent initiatives for electronic deposit of government checks 
may alter welfare recipients’ default from un-banked to banked. A subsidy to employers who 
offer bank accounts and direct deposit may help further.  
 
Second, those working to move the poor into the formal banking sector should be trained to 
explore possible channel factors. Handing out a map with directions to the bank, asking people to 
specify a time for an appointment, or having a bank representative available on location when 
people come to learn about subsidized programs such as the First Accounts program may impact 
take-up.  Community groups involved in helping people with their EITC could also link the 
opening of an account to EITC refund. 
 
Third, policies should aim to reduce the psychological barriers associated with a bank account.  
Previous studies have shown that bank cost structure is viewed as too complicated by many poor, 
who prefer check-cashing places where pricing is transparent. Our own survey suggests that many 
lower-income people who tried banking were left with bad associations due to unanticipated 
account fees. A government policy aimed at mandating simpler fee structures may prove highly 
effective. Even if that leads to higher overall fees, the simplicity of the structure may help to 
avoid the common tendencies to defer, procrastinate, or renounce altogether because of 
complications.  
 
People’s identity salience may also play a supportive role. As recent social psychological research 
has shown, people derive their self-identity from the groups to which they belong, and may 
regularly alternate among different salient identities. Thus, a working mother might think of 
herself primarily as a mother when in the company of her children, but see herself primarily as a 
professional while at work. The list of potential identities is extensive, with some identities (e.g., 
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“mother”) likely to conjure up strikingly different values and ideals from others (e.g., “welfare 
participant”). In promoting banking, as well as other social programs, particular identities may be 
triggered that generate greater interest and willingness than others. 
 
Policies that encourage the take-up of bank accounts may naturally lead to improved savings and 
budgeting in general. For one, the opening of a checking account can provide access to services 
such as automatic electronic payments that may help reduce the occurrence of neglected bills.  
Furthermore, as has been documented among the non-poor, an increased utilization of saving 
accounts, partially as commitment devices, can increase savings. In open surveys we and others 
have conducted, many lower-income households report using otherwise very expensive lay-away 
schemes as a way to commit to saving for a specific goal. Survey research on IDA plans, which 
offer lower-income people matching funds for savings towards a productive asset, point towards a 
similar desire for commitment devices in this population, where a large majority of participants 
report favoring the strict withdrawal rules that characterize most current IDA plans. Bank 
accounts that offer concrete targets with mild commitment (such as a penalty for early 
withdrawal) would be much preferable to expensive lay-away schemes. Also, rather than abstract 
accounts, banks or community groups could try to promote the formation of “dedicated 
accounts:” a “fridge account,” an “education account,” or a “car account.” Such labeling could be 
enticing and serve as a reminder of what is being saved for.   
 
Finally, defaults may also help stimulate higher savings. Studies of middle-class savings behavior 
(Benartzi and Thaler, forthcoming) suggest that savings works best as a default, such as in 
401(k)s where cash is automatically deposited into savings. IDA plans offer an easy opportunity 
to incorporate such default in the saving decision of the poor, for example through automatic 
deductions from paychecks. In fact, a program analogous to the “Save More Tomorrow” plan 
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which allows people to choose their deduction levels for future paychecks, could be implemented 
within the IDA plans.  
 
III.   Social Programs 
 
The poor have access to a myriad of transfer programs, which nevertheless show a remarkably 
low take-up rate. Again, economists’ answer to this puzzle has been to look for large economic 
costs that might enter into the cost-benefit analyses of the poor when they decide not to 
participate. One oft-cited big cost is the “stigma” attached to such programs.   
 
Other factors could also help explain low program take-up.  First, various “small” hassles that can 
dissuade action appear especially salient in this context. A recent comprehensive study of food 
stamp applications found dramatic hassle costs. State applications reach up 36 pages and often 
include incomprehensible questions. The application process often cues negative identities and 
can induce guilt and alienation. People are finger-printed (to verify that they are not double-
dipping in other locations), they encounter perjury threats, they undergo home visits to verify they 
are “really poor,” and they are often condescended to. Such treatment is likely to reinforce the 
alienation and hopelessness that often discourage this population.  As discussed earlier, such 
hassle factors may appear negligible in a standard cost-benefit analysis, but are the kind of 
barriers whose removal may open channels for desirable behaviors.   
 
Finally, just as people procrastinate on medical check-ups or signing up for 401(k)s, the poor may 
procrastinate in signing up for welfare programs. This is likely exacerbated by some of the factors 
discussed above, and by the knowledge that even if they present themselves at the welfare office 
today, chances are they will not get “all signed up” today. The apparent cost of procrastination 
may also appear lower if, for a person not currently enrolled, non-participation is viewed as a 
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foregone gain rather than a loss. Finally, procrastination may be enhanced by wishful thinking. If 
people believe they will soon get out of poverty or get a job, not applying for the program could 
be perceived as bearing a low cost since it will soon no longer be needed. 
 
Policy Implications 
 
What policies could a benevolent, behaviorally-minded policy maker explore to encourage take-
up? First, facilitate the process. Reforms to improve the transparency of eligibility rules and user-
friendliness of forms should be considered. In fact, a unique but simple eligibility form for all 
programs (as is already done in some states) may be especially helpful. Also, pre-filled forms 
(where items unlikely to change are automatically filled) could speed up and demystify the re-
certification process.  This is often used in the private sector, for example, in the making of health 
plan choices.  
 
Second, welfare programs may benefit from triggering more positive attitudes. For example, 
evidence suggests that trust may help people feel worthier, and typically encourages reciprocity. 
Instead, current programs often present an adversarial tone, accompanied by monitoring concerns, 
and low expectations. Although money is being transferred, no goodwill is earned.  Changes that 
earn goodwill have the potential to affect not only take-up but also compliance with other aspects 
of program participation, such as job search, attendance, and further referrals. 
 
This discussion also touches on the decentralization of program administration. The federal 
government has attempted to decentralize many aspects of welfare programs while maintaining 
minimum benefit level rules intended to safeguard the system from a “race to the bottom.” But 
alongside minimum benefit rules, there ought to be maximum “hassle” rules.  For, with excessive 
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hassle benefits are often lost. The decentralization process needs to be a guarantee that state and 
local governments will not dissuade take-up (and save money) through the use of various barriers. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Standard economic/policy thinking attribute to people preferences and motivations that they often 
lack, and ignore psychological factors that can be highly consequential.  Deterrence, for example, 
plays a key role in the legal determination of punishment but appears relatively ineffective 
because those who violate the law often tend not to engage in the presumed cost-benefit analyses. 
Similarly, policies geared towards the poor are often driven by normative assumptions, rather 
than empirical facts, in ways that may miss the intended beneficiaries.  Standard thinking 
naturally assume that big effects are due to big causes, and thus merit major intervention. If the 
poor are deeply hurt by their failure to have a bank account, then there must be compelling 
reasons for that failure. Behavioral research, on the other hand, has shown that highly 
consequential behaviors often are triggered by what are deemed to be minor causes. 
 
More empirical research, we believe, should be directed towards testing the effectiveness of 
behaviorally motivated anti-poverty policies, such as the ones discussed above. The good news 
might be that simple and inexpensive policies have substantial impact. The cautionary news is 
that policy makers may need to attend to nuances they often are not trained to attend to: subtle 
distinctions that from a normative perspective may seem immaterial can have large implications 
for a policy’s eventual success.  
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